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Legal Principles on Political Law and Criminal Law: Search and Seizure; Checkpoints; Warrantless Arrests; Chain of Custody

G.R. No. 217097. February 23, 2022

ROLANDO UY Y SAYAN ALIAS "NONOY," Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. 

J. Hernando 

Constitutional Mandate on Search and Seizures.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that search and seizures must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, searches and seizures done without a valid warrant are considered intrusive and unreasonable within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. The Constitution provides further safeguards such that the evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of unreasonable searches and seizures are considered tainted, and consequently, inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

However, there is a recognized exception to the need of securing a warrant before a search may be effected, that is, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. In such instances, the law requires that there be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. The process cannot be reversed.

Moreover, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for instances when a lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant:

SEC. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.

Briefly, there are three instances when warrantless arrests may be effected. These are: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which has just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Among the circumstances where a warrantless arrest is allowed, the arrest of the suspect in flagrante delicto imposes a rigid, if not strict, compliance with its elements. An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two elements: (a) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Jurisprudence has also carved out an additional exception to the necessity of securing a search warrant prior to the conduct of a search. In Caballes v. People, this Court discussed the validity of warrantless searches on moving vehicles, to wit:

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus, the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

Checkpoints are not illegal per se.

This case presents us with a situation wherein an individual was arrested during a checkpoint search. Setups of the military or police checkpoints are considered a variant of searching moving vehicles which are not illegal per se, for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. Inspections at checkpoints are not violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches if limited to the following: 

(a) the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; 

(b) simply looks into a vehicle; 

(c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; 

(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;

(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and 

(e) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Checkpoint searches are considered valid as long as it is limited to a mere routine inspection. However, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search instead of a mere routine inspection, such search remains valid as long as the officers who conducted the search have a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.

Warrantless arrest and the concomitant search in this case is valid.

This Court has ruled in several instances that although as a general rule, motorists as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may also be stopped to allow authorized personnel to conduct an extensive search when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that either the motorist is a law offender, or that the contents of the vehicle are, or have been, instruments of some offense.

As may be gleaned from the records of this case, petitioner, who was driving a red motorcycle, passed by the mobile check point at Purok 4, Sitio Paso, Barangay Mabuhay, San Fernando, Bukidnon, where SPO2 Llorin was stationed. The motorcycle was then flagged down, and SPO2 Llorin asked petitioner for his OR/CR. However, he failed to produce the documents. The police authorities then became suspicious that the motorcycle might have been stolen considering petitioner's failure to produce the OR/CR. Moreover, upon inspection of the motor vehicle, the police officers chanced upon a plastic cellophane protruding from the tools compartment. When petitioner opened the tools compartment, the police officers found a small bundle of dried marijuana placed inside a transparent cellophane.

The police officers then scrutinized the motorcycle and further found the same transparent cellophane in the driver seat. Upon opening the driver's seat, the police officers discovered five more bundles of marijuana wrapped in a cellophane. Immediately after, the police officers brought petitioner to the police station where he was further interviewed and eventually detained. The marijuana specimen were brought to the laboratory for examination.

Based on the foregoing, while it is true that the root of the encounter of the police officers and the petitioner was due to the mobile check point in implementation of the COMELEC gun ban, the arrest was not made by reason of the COMELEC gun ban or any traffic violation. Instead, it was in light of petitioner's failure to present his OR/CR, which raised suspicions on the part of the police officers, prompting them to inquire further and look into the motor vehicle, on the theory that petitioner might be committing a crime or the motor vehicle itself is the subject of the crime already committed. The consequent search conducted by the police officers led to the confiscation of marijuana from petitioner.

Rule on Chain of Custody was not complied with.

In particular, the records show that there was noncompliance by the police officers at the rule on chain of custody. The chain of custody refers to the duly recorded, authorized movements, and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation, to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination, until it is presented to the court. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or tails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 further expounded on this provision:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the apprehending officers to immediately conduct the marking, physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. Moreover, the physical inventory and taking of photographs shall be conducted in the presence of: (a) the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (d) an elected public official, after seizure and confiscation.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The procedure laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is considered substantive law and not merely a procedural technicality.45 The law requires that the police authorities implementing RA 9165 strictly comply with the chain of custody procedure, although failure to strictly do so does not, ipso facto, render the seizure and custody over the illegal drugs as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence were preserved.

In this case however, there was total lack of compliance. A review of the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties show that an inventory report was not accomplished by any of the police officers. In fact, an inventory report was never mentioned in all the transmittal documents accomplished by the concerned authorities. Absent the inventory report, the required presence of the insulating witnesses cannot be considered to have been complied with. Consequently, rendering a judgment of conviction without being able to establish that petitioner, along with the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165, were able to personally see the movement of the seized drugs amounts to a violation of substantive law.

In view of the foregoing lapses in the chain of custody and ultimately, lack of compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, petitioner's acquittal is warranted. Serious uncertainty hangs over the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti introduced into evidence by the prosecution.


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